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The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the requirements of naval
command and control for future Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and to propose
solutions for current limitations.
Currently, UAVs co-exist as a collection of independent systems that have poor
interoperability and limited functionality beyond strategic reconnaissance. As UAVs
mature, they will increasingly be deployed at the unit level and employed tactically,
increasing the need for coordination and the dissemination of information. Command and
control systems must evolve to keep pace with this development.
A description of contemporary and proposed UAV systems is presented, and this
Thesis uses a scenario to illustrate current limitations and develop the requirements for
UAV command and control.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this Thesis is to demonstrate the increasing sophistication and
growing utility of modern UAVs and the underlying problem with command and control,
which is unprepared to leverage these capabilities into combat effectiveness. The
problem can be summarized as a strategic imagery analysis structure that cannot meet the
dynamic requirements of tactical reconnaissance and under-developed CONOPS that do
not address necessary requirements.
This Thesis first outlines the history and impetus of the trend towards greater use
of UAVs. This shows that UAVs have entered a period of increasing need for worldwide
reconnaissance during a sustained U.S. military downsizing. The concurrent maturation
of key aeronautical technologies thrusts UAVs into a role of providing primary
reconnaissance capabilities.
The HAE class of UAVs is able to provide sustained surveillance that matches,
and in some measures exceeds satellite and manned overflight capabilities. They provide
real-time, high-resolution imagery that has the potential to greatly improve battle space
awareness and the ability to improve strategic decision-making.
The VTUAV brings advanced reconnaissance capabilities to the fleet end user.
No longer dependent on tactical aircraft and external intelligence support, the fleet gains
the capability with VTUAVs to maintain organic 24-hour surveillance over areas of
interest. With the addition of the Tactical Control System and satellite reception, each
ship in the battle group has access to this imagery.
The Thesis develops a scenario that highlights the difficulties that can be expected
when these advanced UAVs are deployed. The HAE UAV is intended as a strategic
reconnaissance asset, but employed with current technology provides imagery analysis
and dissemination that will deliver stale data to tactical users. This problem lies not in
the technology available for delivering the imagery, because GBS has been successfully
demonstrated in this capacity, but with the analysis process, our CONOPS.
communications and intelligence.
The primary problem with the HAE UAV is that the analysis will occur within the
bounds of a strategic system, which was developed primarily to support strategic decision
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making and not the tactical customer. This imagery analysis and dissemination cycle has
only recently been pressured for quicker turnaround. The overriding constraint is the
labor intensive nature of imagery analysis, and even with plans to move the analysis into
theater, the bottleneck remains the man in the loop.
Additional problems with the HAE UAV command and control structure are the
inability to respond to dynamic situations and the lack of a mechanism for effective
sensor to shooter engagements. The HAE UAV is a strategic asset that is properly tasked
through the ATO, but it will undoubtedly be requested to respond to dynamic situations.
These requests will come from the tactical warfighters and from the fleet.
The command and control structure must be able to quickly forward and evaluate
these requests against other collection requirements. When these requests result in a
bonified requirement for a sensor to shooter engagement, the target data must either be
quickly passed to a suitable shooter or the target must be handed-off to a tactical UAV for
continued surveillance.
The VTUAVs will be the fleet's primary tactical reconnaissance asset, especially
over geographically remote or hostile areas. The fleet, however, must be upgraded to
harness this significant capability. Primarily, the fleet requires a command and control
structure and imagery processing pipeline that is responsive to tactical requirements.
The command and control problem is partially solved by TCS, which provides the
GMCS connectivity to distribute track information. The remaining problem is how to get
dynamic mission tasking across the fleet to the vehicle operator, preferably in a visual
format. The clearest command will be a fly-to point on the operator's console.
The VTUAV image processing problem is mainly due to the lack of trained fleet
imagery analysts and limited ship to ship bandwidth. The imagery analyst problem can
be partially overcome by leveraging the available resources with technology. An
imagery analysis center would best execute the analysis by co-locating these scarce
personnel with sophisticated analysis software.
Once this analysis is performed, the imagery must be directed to the best platform
for sensor to shooter engagements. The only current solution is to utilize the direct receipt
of imagery (level 2) capabilities of TCS. The lack of ship to ship bandwidth makes any
other transmission path difficult
I. INTRODUCTION
This Thesis examines the command and control structure that will be necessary to
leverage the additional capabilities presented by the proliferation of UAVs. A history
and overview of the impetus for this trend is presented in this chapter.
A. HISTORY OF UAVs
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are not new to warfare or to the Navy.
Although examples of unmanned aircraft can be traced to World War I, the first UAV
used for reconnaissance was the BQM-34 Firebee [Ref. 1: p. 30-31]. This drone was
initially developed in 1954 as a jet-powered target drone, but when Gary Francis Powers
was shot down over the Soviet Union the Firebee was quickly converted for
reconnaissance duties.
The BQM-34 was demonstrated using existing photo reconnaissance cameras.
Later, a BQM-34 with larger wings designed to fly at high altitude was developed as the
first UAV designed specifically for the reconnaissance mission. [Ref 2] This UAV, the
AQM-34Q, allowed the US to conduct sensitive reconnaissance missions without risking
political embarrassment through the loss of human life. It was used extensively for
intelligence collection against Cuba and later Vietnam. In Vietnam, during an operation
called Buffalo Hunter, the Firebee proved the unmanned aircraft concept with a mere 4%
attrition rate during over 3000 combat missions. [Ref 3] Figure 1-1 illustrates the
AQM-34Q.
Figure 1-1. AQM-34Q in Vietnam.
The secretive Buffalo Hunter missions were flown mainly to cover areas
determined too hazardous for manned reconnaissance aircraft. Some were at altitudes of
60,000 feet and above; others were below 1,000 feet. Missions involved photography
and real-time TV relay to a DC-130, electronic intelligence (ELINT) that increased the
safety of our manned aircraft in hostile areas, and communications intelligence
(COMINT). Some UAV missions, conducted at very low altitudes necessitated by poor
weather conditions, provided battle damage assessments (BDAs) to confirm that our
strike aircraft had hit their assigned targets. In all cases, these missions were conducted
at a fraction of the cost of and risk to manned aircraft. [Ref 4]
In the 1980's United States military operations in Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya
identified a need for an on-call, inexpensive, unmanned, over-the-horizon targeting,
reconnaissance, and BDA capability for local commanders. The result was the Pioneer
UAV system. [Ref 5] The US Navy kept at least one Pioneer airborne at all times during
Desert Storm, where it was used for surveillance, targeting and damage assessment. The
Pioneer has also been used extensively in subsequent operations.
[Ref 6] Figure 1-2 illustrates the Pioneer.
Figure 1-2. Pioneer UAV.
The Pioneer information was provided to theater and component commanders,
and as a result, Iraqi patrol boats were detected, a strike on two high-speed patrol boats
was directed, and two Silkworm anti-ship missile sites were located. LtGen Boomer,
USMC Central Command, praised pioneer as "the single most valuable intelligence
collector". ADM Jeremiah, Chairman JROC, stated "[Pioneer] proved that the utility of
the unmanned aerial vehicle can be decisive in future battles." During Desert Storm, with
85% of the U.S.'s manned tactical reconnaissance assets committed, UAVs emerged as a
"must have" capability. [Ref 5]
This success of the Pioneer during Desert Storm and other factors led to an
expanded effort to incorporate UAVs into the intelligence hierarchy. The result has
included such advanced UAVs as the Predator, Outrider, Global Hawk and DarkStar,
with many others in development. UAVs clearly have a bright future.
B. THE GROWING ROLE OF UAVS
The time for UAV acceptance appears to be here for a number of reasons. First,
the declining force structure, people, and equipment necessitates innovative thinking
about solutions that more cost-effectively accomplish Navy missions. UAVs are more
cost effective and mission effective in many of the traditional manned aircraft mission
areas. Replacing these manned missions with UAVs not only frees manned aircraft to be
utilized elsewhere, but expands reconnaissance into areas that were not accessible or
prudent for manned aircraft overflight.
Secondly, technologies have emerged and matured as very significant enablers for
unmanned missions. The development of GPS, for example, allows UAVs to operate
autonomously over extended distances with great accuracy. Advances in sensors,
electronics, propulsion, and satellite communications are precursors to the advanced
capabilities of modern UAVs. These UAVs will continue to mature as the technology
develops.
Finally, the U.S. is still expected to maintain a global response capability. Our
nation must maintain an effective military force that can contribute to both deterrence and
quick-reaction situations. Further, emerging political realities will demand our forces be
used with greater precision, less risk, and more effectiveness. [Ref 4]
These basic tenets have led to a greater appreciation for the value of timely
information. We need to know what is on the battlefield before we get to the battlefield.
This reconnaissance must also be performed over long periods of time, regardless of
weather. It must provide information products that are both timely and readily accessible
to weapon system operators as well as to commanders. UAVs increasingly fill this role.
[Ref4]
C. THE CHALLENGE OF UAVS
While it is clear that UAVs have developed rapidly to fill a critical reconnaissance
need, the underlying command and control structure has not kept pace to fully utilize
these advances. Command and control has not evolved to leverage UAV reconnaissance
information into a true force multiplier. The goal of this Thesis is to examine the
limitations the current command and control structure imposes on the utility of UAVs
and to develop solutions.
This Thesis will be organized in five chapters. Chapter I introduces the
dichotomy between UAV technological advancement and underlying command and
control development. Chapter II builds background information on several UAV classes
pertinent to the Navy and the Tactical Control System. Chapter III develops a scenario to
expose the limitations of current UAV doctrine. Chapter IV proposes solutions to the
limitations identified in Chapter III. Finally, Chapter V provides a conclusion and
recommendations.
II. UAV SYSTEMS
Chapter I discussed the history of UAVs and their growing role in the modern
military force structure. This chapter will examine several programs with the greatest
impact on future Navy command and control requirements.
A. HAE UAVs
The High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (HAE UAV) is
designed to provide extended reconnaissance capability to the Joint Force commander.
1. Background
In November of 1993, the Congressional Authorization Conference published a
report that stated, "tactical reconnaissance is relatively more important to national
security than at any other time in our history." [Ref 7] Consequently, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense created the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) to
unify current reconnaissance architectures and manage the future acquisition of all joint
service and Defense-wide airborne manned and unmanned reconnaissance and
surveillance capabilities. [Ref 7: p. ES-1] Therein lies the great challenge for DARO: to
develop standard data formats and common tasking strategies for all the disparate
systems ranging from U-2 and its unique tasking, processing, and dissemination
architectures to the smallest tactical UAV with its own non-developmental item
architectures, while insuring appropriate interfaces with national collection systems to
support the warfighter [Ref 7: p. 1.7-8].
UAVs have been grouped into four operational categories: maneuver range,
tactical range, medium range and endurance. The endurance UAV category describes a
class of vehicles operating at medium and high altitudes, carrying payloads with multi-
mission performance capabilities and on-demand support across all mission areas, with
flight duration normally in excess of 24 hours. [Ref 8: p. 1.4]
Endurance UAV systems provide a broad spectrum of intelligence collection
capability to support joint combatant forces in worldwide peace, crisis, and wartime
operations. The capabilities of these UAV systems will provide for adaptive real-time
planning of current operations, to include: monitoring enemy offensive and defensive
positions, deception postures and combat assessment. Endurance UAVs will provide a
rapid turnaround of raw data to aid a robust targeting cycle following a 'First Look, First
Shoot, First Kill' methodology. [Ref 8: p. 2.1]
The endurance UAV classification includes both Medium Altitude Endurance and
High Altitude Endurance divisions. The HAE UAV program consists of two
complementary air platforms, the Tier II Plus Global Hawk and the Tier III Minus
DarkStar, and a common mission ground control station.
The Global Hawk air vehicle is optimized for supporting low-to moderate threat,
long-endurance surveillance missions in which range, endurance and persistent coverage
are paramount. The DarkStar vehicle features an incorporation of low observables, or
stealth, and is optimized for a moderate endurance, high-altitude reconnaissance mission
in which ensured, survivable coverage is more important than range and endurance.
This dual approach provides a flexible and cost-effective mix of platforms. For the
purposes of this thesis, Global Hawk and DarkStar will be jointly considered as the HAE
UAV class, but each will be described here separately.
2. System Capabilities
The HAE UAV system is designed to provide 24-hour continuous broad area
coverage of areas of interest within the entire theater of operations. It will be able to
provide Real-time Surveillance, Targeting, and Acquisition (RSTA) and Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA) imagery of areas up to 3000 nautical miles from the base of
operations. It will provide imagery with the necessary geolocation accuracy and
resolution in a timely manner to operational commanders so as to support real-time
combat planning and execution
According to the HAE UAV CONOPS, potential applications of HAE UAVs
include [Ref 8: p. 2.1]:
• Near-Real-Time (NRT) Targeting and Precision Strike Support.
Endurance UAVs will shorten the targeting cycle through NRT precise
location of mobile enemy forces. Endurance UAV sensor resolution and
accuracy will enable expanded use of precision-guided munitions, improving
battlefield accuracy.
•NRT Combat Assessment. Immediate feedback of planned and executed
operations will assist with the efficient prosecution of campaigns and
minimize the fog and friction of war.
Enemy Order of Battle (EOB) Information. Allows a rapid means to
develop and track enemy order of battle information, especially in areas where
information is sparse.
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). Provides high-resolution, NRT imagery
of target damage. Immediate feedback will accelerate planning for restrike
requirements.
• Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Survey areas of interest in
preparation for battle or amphibious assaults and landings.
• Special Operations. UAVs can track high-interest individuals or
organizations. UAVs also have the potential to provide direct imagery down
links to ground Special Forces operations units.
A complete HAE UAV weapon system will consist of an air vehicle segment, a
launch and recovery element (LRE), a mission control element (MCE), a ground
communications element (GCE), and a support element (SE). A >5000-foot runway is
required for HAE air vehicles. [2.5.4]
The MCE contains four workstations: the mission planning station, air vehicle
operator, image quality control, and communications management. All equipment is
contained within a standard shelter, which houses the crewmembers at their stations,
generators, a Ku band earth terminal and other necessary equipment. All equipment is air
transportable in C-17, C-141 or C-130 aircraft as part of the system deployment. The
HAE UAV ground segment, including the MCE, LRE and SE is common between the
Global Hawk and DarkStar and can be used interchangeably between the two.
a. Global Hawk
The Global Hawk is considered the workhorse of the HAE UAV mix. It is
a conventionally designed, jet-powered aircraft optimized for payload, range and
endurance. It is a 24,000-pound vehicle capable of operating at 65,000-foot altitude with
up to forty-two hours of endurance. In terms of physical size, it has an overall wingspan
of 1 16 feet and a length of 44 feet. Its overall size is comparable to a U-2. Figure 2-1
.
Figure 2-1. Global Hawk during test flight.
The Global Hawk is optimized for supporting low-to-moderate threat, long
endurance surveillance missions in which range, endurance and time on station are
paramount. The survivability is enhanced by its mission profile (i.e. high altitude and
standoff). Table 2-1 shows a summary of Global Hawk characteristics.
Table 2-1. Global Hawk UAV system characteristics. From Ref []
Characteristic Global Hawk HAE UAV
Operating Radius 3000 nautical miles
Operating Altitude Up to 65,000 feet
True Air Speed 300-400 Knots
Time on Station 24 hours at maximum radius
Fuel Reserve 1 Hour
Survivability Measures Threat Warning and limited ECM
Sensors SAR: 1 m search, 0.3 m spot
EO: NIIRS 6+
IR: NIIRS 5+
Ground Motion Target Indication
b. DarkStar
The DarkStar is more of a special purpose aircraft targeted for use in high-
threat environments prior to suppression of hostile air defenses. It incorporates
unconventional design and is optimized for the incorporation of low observability, or
stealth, for survivability. It has a gross weight of 8,600 pounds and can operate at a
45,000-foot altitude for more than eight hours. Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2. DarkStar on flight ramp.
The DarkStar is designed to penetrate into high-threat areas where the risk
to the Global Hawk UAV is high. This vehicle is designed for low observability and is
optimized for moderate endurance, high-threat reconnaissance missions in which ensured
coverage is more important than range or endurance. The DarkStar operates with the
same GCE as the Global Hawk, but its limited range and Differential GPS require that it
operate from a field where the LRE is located. Its lower endurance and smaller size also
require that it be transported into theater, whereas the Global Hawk air vehicle has the
capability to self-deploy. Table 2-2 shows a summary of DarkStar characteristics.,
Table 2-2. DarkStar UAV system characteristics. From Ref [
Characteristic DarkStar HAE UAV
Operating Radius 500 nautical miles
Operating Altitude Greater than 45,000 feet
True Air Speed >250 Knots
Time on Station 8 hours at maximum radius
Fuel Reserve 30 minutes
Survivability Measures Very low observable
Sensors SAR: 1 m search, 0.3 m spot
EO: NIIRS 6+
IR: none
3. Command and Control
The HAE UAV command and control structure is important because it delineates
the authority to make employment policy decisions, particularly during contingency
operations. These decisions include the policy for handling requests for immediate
imagery support and subsequent dynamic tasking. The following information is taken
from the HAE UAV CONOPS, it describes how command and control might work when
the HAE UAV is deployed.
The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) has Combatant Command over
all HAE UAV assets. Operational Command (OPCON) of endurance UAVs will be the
responsibility of Air Combat Command (ACC), USACOM 's Air Force component,
during peacetime operations. Such operations include training, readiness, and the
development of tactics and sensors.
Theater CINCs who want to use the HAE UAV system must issue a request to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS may approve the request based upon coordination
with USACOM and the availability ofHAE UAV assets. An HAE UAV detachment will
then be deployed to support the CINC. During these exercises, HAE UAVs will fall
under the exercise command structure.
During contingency or support of wartime operation OPCON of deployed
endurance UAVs transfers to the theater CINC once the asset is in the supported area of
responsibility (AOR). OPCON of deployed endurance UAVs transfers to the theater
CINC once the asset is in the supported AOR. Consequently, all HAE UAVs will be
considered theater assets to be used to support the theater CINC or Joint Force
Commander (JFC). [Ref 8: p. 4.0]
4. Tasking
According to the HAE UAV CONOPS, routine tasking of endurance imagery
collection is accomplished through the established JTF Collection Management Process
via the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The process starts with the theater J-2 assigned by the
JFC. The J-2 will be responsible for collection management of the HAE UAV system.
This will involve accepting all Requests for Information (RFI), prioritizing these requests
based on JFC objectives, and defining reporting requirements.
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Once the J-2 has fulfilled these responsibilities, the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) will schedule sorties for the HAE UAV based upon the
requirements given him by the J-2. The JFACC will also integrate the HAE into the Air
Control Plan (ACP) in order to deconflict manned operations from unmanned operations
in the same airspace. The final product is the ATO. Due to the endurance characteristics
(>24 hours) of these UAVs, a single endurance UAV mission may cross several ATO
cycles.
Ad Hoc tasking is also envisioned in the endurance UAV CONOPS. The ground
control station will likely receive ad hoc tasking while the UAV is in flight. The latency
of these requests passing through the chain of command and the total delay in an ad hoc
tasking decision is not known. Furthermore, procedures for ad hoc requests and
performance thresholds for execution have not been determined.
5. Imagery Dissemination
The HAE UAV imagery dissemination pipeline begins at the air vehicle sensor
and, for the purposes of this thesis, ends with the fleet user. The pathway consists of
communications both internal and external to the HAE UAV system. Internal
communications are comprised of the links within the HAE UAV system, while external
communications describe how the imagery gets distributed to analysis centers, the fleet,
















Figure 2-3. Line of Sight transmission
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transmit sensor data at a rate of 137 Mbits/s through the Common Data Link (CDL). The
CDL is a full-duplex link, available only in LOS mode, that offers the largest data
throughput. The MCE is capable of receiving imagery at the full 137 Mbits/s, but other
users may be constrained by the capacity of their equipment. Most of these tactical users
will have communications equipment that is limited to T-l data rates and will be able to
receive the data at rates from 1.5 to 10 Mbits/s. A limitation of LOS mode is that
multiple ground locations can not simultaneously receive the imagery. The author
believes that LOS communications will be limited to the MCE, due to its capacity to
handle the full data capacity, processing capability, and connectivity with C4I nodes.
Figure 2-4 shows how the air vehicle will transmit sensor data utilizing UHF and
SHF SATCOM while operating in OTH mode. Any Ku-band commercial satellite is
suitable for this use, including PANAMSAT and INTELSAT. Data rates are limited to
50 Mbs for Global Hawk due to satellite bandwidth limitations and 1.544 Mbs for











Figure 2-4. Over the Horizon transmission
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suitable equipment that is in the satellite's footprint can simultaneously receive this
imagery with other ground stations. OTH data rates are much lower than LOS data rates,
and the air vehicle effective radius will most likely place most communications in the
OTH realm.
The airborne sensor suites for the endurance UAVs and their ground-segment
components interact through OTH satellite relay and LOS links to maintain sensor data
dissemination communications paths. According to the HAE UAV CONOPS, the GCE
has limited capabilities to disseminate collected intelligence directly to an exploitation
ground system or battlefield customer, including the fleet. The emerging Global
Broadcast Service (GBS) concept is expected to form the foundation for near-real-time
dissemination ofUAV intelligence products to the fleet. [Ref 8: p. 6.1]
B. VTUAVs
The last section discussed HAE UAVs, which are theater level assets. This
section discusses VTUAVs, which are designed to be employed tactically at the unit
level.
1. Background
The deployment of the Pioneer UAV system starting in the late 1980's showed
the utility of a sea based UAV system. The increased mobility of naval forces, the
extended range of operations and the variety of missions confronting the naval task forces
are all factors driving the need for an integrated reconnaissance asset. As this
requirement for organic reconnaissance collection capability grows UAVs must be
capable of being operated from a range of ships with limited impact on flight deck
operations. Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) will require increased
dexterity for the organic collection of reconnaissance and the precision targeting of
weapons for OMFTS to reach its full potential. These factors drove the requirement for a
VTOL UAV (VTUAV) to replace the Pioneer system.
VTUAV upgrades the Pioneer system, which has deficiencies with limited
shipboard compatibility, limited payload capacity, obsolete and system-unique GCS and
inadequate speed. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in
partnership with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), have formulated
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a program to explore two new vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) concepts to fill the
required need. Final physical design has not been determined, but performance
objectives have been established.
VTUAV is more than just a replacement for the Pioneer, it is a Naval Warfare
enabler necessary for the strike weapons envisioned for the 21 st century. For surface
combatants the VTUAV will become an integral part of the suite of precision weapon
systems. The VTUAV will provide real-time targeting for long-range naval guns and
will support targeting for the full range of air delivered weapons.
The VTUAV will provide the ability to operate from all ships capable of
conducting helicopter operations. According to the VTUAV CONOPS, three surface
combatants are viewed in the near term: DDG-51, CG-47 and DD 963. FFG-7 could
support UAV operations but it would not be in support of any shipboard weapons.
CV/CVNs will not host or embark VTUAVs, however, they will have TCS for receive
and control capability.
2. Organization
The VTUAV system will be located in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
squadrons which will be organized and operate similar to LAMPS Mk III squadrons.
UAV detachments will be available to deploy with VTUAV systems on a rotating basis.
Two of these detachments will be in a deployed status at all times aboard the deployed
LANTFLT and PACFLT ships. [Ref 9: p. 29]
A UAV detachment will be embarked under the command of an Officer-In-
Charge (OIC). The detachment will be stationed on the ship with the UAVs and include
personnel responsible for operation and maintenance of the system. The system can be
deployed as the sole air asset or in combination with other aircraft such as the SH-60B
Seahawk. [Ref 9: p. 27]
3. Missions Capabilities
The VTUAV system will be assigned to a range of missions, and any one mission
may include a number of mission objectives from different areas. The VTUAV is
expected to provide primary support to the unit operating the UAV, but will directly or
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indirectly support other ships. The VTUAV will also support additional missions as the
payloads are developed.
The VTUAV employment extends the effective range of the weapons and sensors
of the ship, promotes unity of effort, and increases mission effectiveness. According to
the VTUAV CONOPS, some of the potential missions of the VTUAV include:
[Ref9:p. 11 ]
• Reconnaissance. The system supports a wide range of reconnaissance
requirements for amphibious maneuver operations including the full spectrum
of combat operations. The reconnaissance will be conducted to support a
broad range of intelligence collection objectives.
• Naval Surface Fire Support. VTUAV imaging data will allow ships to fire
on targets beyond line-of-sight, increasing the maximum effective range of
shipboard guns. The VTUAV spotting will reduce rounds required per target
by 50% due to increased first round accuracy and improved spotting data.
• Battle Damage Assessment. The VTUAV can provide long term staying
power to conduct Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) in the objective area.
The VTUAV may be employed to determine damage inflicted by units outside
the battle group. The data will be critical to accurately determine the status of
hostile forces and to plan re-targeting.
• Close Air Support. The VTUAV can be deployed to assist in the direction of
Close Air Support. In this role the UAV can assist in performing the
functions of the Forward Air Controller (FAC). During this mission the UAV
operator would communicate directly with the strike aircraft.
• Communications Relay. The VTUAV will have the capability through a
communications relay package to provide network connectivity between
forces ashore and at sea and to provide communications relay services for
CSAR or FAC.
While a specific VTUAV air vehicle has not been chosen, the operational
characteristics have been determined. These performance characteristics are intended to
align the operational capabilities of the VTUAV to the mission needs of the fleet while
limiting the impact of flight deck operations. These performance characteristics are listed
in Table 2.3.
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Table 2-3. VTUAV system characteristics. From Ref [9]
Characteristic VTUAV
Operating Radius 1 1 nautical miles
Operating Altitude Up to 15,000 feet
True Air Speed 1 10 Knots with 25knot headwind
Time on Station 3 hours at 1 1 nm with full payload
Fuel JP-5s
Survivability Measures Low radar signature and muffled exhaust
Sensors Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
Real-time TV
Limits for shipboard recovery +/- 3 degrees pitch, +/- 8 degrees roll
A potential platform for selection as the VTUAV is the Eagle Eye. The Eagle
Eye is a tiltrotor aircraft whose proprotors permit it to take-off and land vertically. In
transition to airplane mode, the counter-rotating proprotors mounted on each wing tip
nacelle are rotated 90 ° forward, thus converting the Eagle Eye into a highly efficient
turboprop airplane. Figure 2-5 illustrates the physical characteristics of a VTUAV.
Figure 2-5. Eagle Eye VTUAV
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4. Command and Control
The VTUAV command and control structure is only briefly discussed in the
VTUAV CONOPS and requires documentation. However, the most likely structure will
be similar to the LAMPS Mk III structure. The ship's Commanding Officer will exercise
supervisory command of the VTUAV in accordance with the battle group warfare
commander's intentions.
According to the VTUAV CONOPS, the UAV Mission Commander, a flight
qualified officer able to execute positive control over a mission, oversees the operations
at the control consoles and serves as the primary point of contact with the ship's CIC.
The Tactical Action Officer will take directions from the CO and change the VTUAV
mission profile as the tactical situation develops. The TAO will also receive VTUAV
tasking from the battle group warfare commander and will relay these intentions to the
UAV mission commander for execution. [Ref 9: p. 20]
There are also several alternatives for physically controlling the VTUAV during a
mission. The normal mode of control will be for the air vehicle to be controlled
throughout the mission by the ship that launched it. However, the VTUAV may also be
controlled by a second control station on a ship or at a land site. During a hand off, the
launching ship passes control to another ship, or shore station, for the direction of the
VTUAV during a portion of the mission. The launching ship will resume control over
the VTUAV for recovery. VTUAV operational command may also be passed when
control is transferred.
5. Tasking
The VTUAV will be operated by and in direct support of the operational
commander. The VTUAV is a tactical asset- not theater or strategic- and is designed to
directly support the tactical war fighter. Sorties will be launched in accordance with a
UAV schedule via the ATO, these prearranged missions are planned in advance, around
intelligence or fire support requirements, and executed at a predetermined time. An
example of prearranged sorties is the scheduling of consecutive sorties on the daily air
plan with set launch and recovery times to provide 24 hour surveillance in an area of
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interest. In addition to pre-arranged sorties, On Call UAV sorties can be scheduled in the
ATO to allow the UAVs to be launched on short notice from specific ships as required.
Pre-arranged VTUAV sorties in the ATO must be planned to include at least the
following items:
• Launch and recovery times.
• Ingress and egress routes.




The degree of pre-arrangement of VTUAV sorties will vary depending on the
level of intelligence of the threat in the objective area. Some sorties may be prearranged
to accomplish a set of tactical objectives. However, flexibility is also necessary to
provide On Call and opportunity sorties during an engagement to meet emerging
requirements. On Call sorties will have a published ready condition of 5-30 minutes.
[Ref9:p. 31]
VTUAV sorties of opportunity will consist of flights scheduled on an ad hoc basis
given the availability of a flight deck for launch, and a ready VTUAV system to support
an emerging requirement. The VTUAV operational support plan must indicate which
elements of the task force can request a sortie of opportunity for each phase of the
operation. [Ref 9: p. 32]
6. Imagery Dissemination
The key to the success of the VTUAV as a tactical asset rests with the
dissemination and analysis of its sensor data. VTUAV generated video will be exported
to other systems by supplying a general use RS-170 video feed from the VTUAV system.
The onboard CCTV system and onboard secondary imagery systems will utilize this
video. The secondary imagery systems will frame grab the video, digitize the video
frame, display and store the freeze frame video. This will provide an off-line freeze
frame video exploitation capability for VTUAV video.
The ship's secondary imagery systems will also provide access to exterior
communications circuits to distribute the exploited freeze frame imagery off board to
other secondary imagery systems both afloat and ashore. The capabilities for any
controlling ship to transmit live video has not been established, but will most likely occur
indirectly through TCS multicast satellite transmission.
C. TCS
1. Background
The Tactical Control System (TCS) is a subsystem of VTUAV. It is the software,
firmware, hardware, and the extra Ground Support Equipment (GSE) (antennae, cabling,
etc.) necessary for the control of Tactical and MAE UAVs. Additionally, TCS will
receive and disseminate data from High Altitude UAVs. [Ref 10: p. 1]
Current tactical UAV systems were initially procured using the Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) acquisition approach. Software and data
links of current tactical UAV systems are not compatible or interoperable. Their ground
control stations do not have the required capabilities or the architectural room for growth
to satisfy all the Joint Service operational requirements. Each UAV ground control
system is unique and not interoperable with other UAV ground control systems.
The TCS program provides joint warfighter commanders with interoperable and
scalable command, control, communications and data dissemination systems for the
family of present and future UAVs. TCS will eliminate the current approach of a unique
control system for each type of UAV. TCS is a subsystem of VTUAV, and will be
interoperable with all UAVs, including Predator, Outrider, and Pioneer, and will be
capable of disseminating critical data for planning, targeting, and combat assessment to
support Joint services at multiple echelons. [Ref 10: p. 1]
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TCS will allow the tactical UAV operator to communicate, receive mission
tasking, conduct mission planning, execute the mission, and collect and disseminate data
from tactical UAVs, including the VTUAV.
2. System Capabilities
The TCS will be interoperable with different types of UAVs and UAV payloads
across five levels of UAV interaction to the extent that it is transparent who is operating
the air vehicle. This will give the shipboard operator the ability to interact with a variety
of UAV platforms with different levels of functionality. The levels of interaction are
listed below and illustrated in figure 2-6 [Ref]:
• Level 1—Receipt and transmission of secondary imagery and/or data.
• Level 2—Direct receipt of imagery and/or data.
• Level 3~Control of the UAV payload in addition to direct receipt of
imagery/data.
• Level 4~Control of the UAV, less launch and recovery, plus all the functions
of level 3.
• Level 5~Full function and control of the UAV from takeoff to landing
OF UAVINTERACT!ON
Figure 2-6. TCS levels of interaction. [Ref 10: p. 24]
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The ultimate operational goal of TCS is to maximize interoperability and
commonality among existing and future UAV systems. By establishing protocols for air
vehicles and interfaces for ground data terminals TCS will provide the shipboard
operators a common set of screen menus and displays to operate any air vehicle. It will
be transparent to operators what air vehicle is providing the imagery. The directions for
air vehicle and payload control will also be the same for all UAV systems. Thus the
ability to operate UAVs in any operation, conducted by one or multiple services, will
dramatically increase their military utility.
3. Command and Control
The TCS will be the control system for future ship-based UAVs and UAV
operations. Since ships already provide the necessary infrastructure to support a
computer-based system (electrical power, environmental control, radio networks, etc.),
the TCS is virtually the GCS for the Navy.
TCS will interface to the existing user infrastructure by accommodating user
platform interface requirements. TCS provides dynamic mission and sensor retasking
during operational mission execution. TCS has the capability to receive and control
payloads on a UAV that is being controlled from another TCS, and it has the ability to
pass control of the UAV from one TCS to another.
TCS also has the capability to directly interface with the JMCIS, therefore
allowing full awareness of its position among all ships through JOTS track symbology.
This enables track de-confliction and allows commanders to accurately assess utilization
and direction of VTUAVs.
4. Imagery Dissemination
The operational objective of the TCS is to get UAV products/ imagery to the
warfighter. The warfighter ranges from the troops in the trenches who are fighting
today's battle to the commanders at all levels that are planning for the successful outcome
of the operation. The TCS supports this effort by providing real time information to
enhance the warfighters situational awareness. [Ref 9: p. 23]
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TCS has the ability to integrate with a spectrum of imagery dissemination and
intelligence protocols. While the majority of these architectures will not be available at a
shipboard TCS installation, most naval C4I architectures are compatible with TCS.
Unfortunately, the capability for broadband connectivity between ships is currently
limited and will not support direct broadcast of live video.
The ability for TCS operators to frame grab live video produces the best
alternative for direct imagery transmission. The lower bandwidth required to transmit a
single frame of imagery will allow direct transmission of the images between ships using
current capabilities.
A second method for imagery transmission is multicast transmission from the air
vehicle to each TCS equipped ship. This method does not enable non-TCS equipped
ships to receive the imagery. However, multicasting will allow all TCS ships to directly
receive sensor data from any compatible UAV using TCS level 2 interaction.
Finally, the TCS console provides aids such as artificial intelligence to alert
operators that there is something of interest in the payload field of view and to assist the
operators in determining what video segments or digital frames to store/pass on.
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III. LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT UAV DOCTRINE
Chapter III uses the background information from Chapter II to develop a
scenario to illustrate the limitations of current UAV command and control doctrine.
Potential solutions to these limitations are proposed in Chapter IV.
A. BACKGROUND
Advances in UAV technology and the procurement of improved systems portend
a radical shift in how these assets will be employed. While existing UAV doctrine is
designed around UAVs with narrow missions, advances in capability will necessitate a
corresponding change in tactics. Increasing inter-connectivity, decreasing cost and
greater flexibility mark the advancing technology of UAVs. This will replace expensive
systems with limited connectivity and narrow missions.
Current UAV systems were born largely from advanced technology
demonstration projects. They were designed more to validate and test the technology
than to operate in standardized command and control environments. While they proved
successful operationally, as demonstrated by the Pioneer during the Gulf War and the
Predator in Bosnia, they were tasked in a very narrow capacity with dedicated command
and control, limited image dissemination, and restricted inter-connectivity.
In the Navy, operational UAV doctrine is based almost entirely on the Pioneer
system. The Pioneer UAV has a narrow mission and a corresponding limited operational
doctrine. This doctrine does not translate to the increased capabilities and expanded
scope the Navy will enjoy with VTUAVs. Furthermore, the Navy must expand its
doctrine to encompass HAE UAVs, since these will feed data into naval C4I systems.
The Navy's IT-21 and JV 2010 policy statements also indicate a paradigm shift
towards increasing inter-connectivity and the concept of Network-centric Warfare. In
this vision, data from all sensors is available across the network for utilization by war
fighters that can parlay a narrow requirement for information into a tactical advantage.
The growth in intelligence gathered by UAVs underscores the requirement to integrate
them into the C4I environment.
The existing UAVs are all independent systems. They do not inter-connect easily
with command and control systems, which isolates them from the lower echelons that
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need the information. The information is strictly in one form: processed data that is
derived from the sensor data. This information must be filtered through a rigid
dissemination process that limits the inherent flexibility of UAVs. Imagery to the tactical
warfighter and real-time tracks will be important for modern UAVs.
A scenario will be developed to illustrate the limitations of current UAV
operating procedures and doctrine. The doctrine will be applied to a simulated military
crisis employing UAVs. The scenario will be developed in several stages to illustrate the
manner in which HAE and tactical UAVs are employed using existing doctrine. The
scenario will progress through a crisis in a distant third-world country where UAVs will
be employed through each stage of the crisis.
B. TASKING SCENARIO
In the country of Orange, a coastal country located south of Liberia, a U.S.
embassy dispatch indicates that rebel forces are attacking the capital and initial
indications are that the ruling government has been thrown into exile. The president and
his cabinet escaped and are safe.
The rebels are thought to have 1 00,000 troops and a supply of modern armor,
including tanks, surface to air missiles, and attack aircraft. A country that is sponsoring
socialist expansionism throughout the region supplied this armor, and the West views the
rebels and their weapons as a significant threat to stability in the region. A communique
from the rebel commander indicates that he has taken control of Orange and will rule a
socialist government, all foreigners will be expelled. The exiled president appeals to the
United States for military assistance.
The initial US military response is to dispatch a carrier battle group along with an
amphibious ready group to the scene. In this instance, littoral operations are suitable
since Orange is a coastal country. Assuming that the CBG is in the Mediterranean,
transit to Orange will take 2 days. Transit from the Gulf, if ordered, could add up to 3
days.
Concurrent to the carrier deployment, the national command authority begins
reconnaissance efforts to gather information about the rebel forces. Items of interest
include the location and size of troop concentrations, the location of tanks, aircraft, and
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missile sites. Secondary intelligence concentrates on cartography and examining the
existing database of intelligence data.
C. LIMITATIONS
The limitations of HAE UAVs and VTUAVs share a common theme: reducing
the time directly related to proper command and control, and the integration of UAVs
with operating forces.
1. HAE UAV Imagery Dissemination
The initial reconnaissance is important because it aids military planning. The
information flows to the National Command Authority (NCA), which uses it to formulate
strategy for the impending arrival of the battle group, among other things. The strategic
reconnaissance centers around three assets: satellites, RSTA platforms, and HAE UAVs.
All are considered national reconnaissance assets and tasked accordingly. For the HAE
UAV, this implies a rigid decision chain and latency in tasking through the Air Tasking
Order (ATO).
The latency of initial satellite employment results mostly from the time required
for shifting orbits. RSTA platforms such as the U-2 or JSTARS could respond more
quickly, but a delay is imposed on photo imagery by aircraft recovery and film
development. Only HAE UAVs can respond relatively quickly and provide continuous
real-time imagery. The initial response may be slower than the U-2, but the HAE UAV
has the advantage of extended loiter times and real-time imagery dissemination. In our
scenario, Tier II plus Global Hawk HAE UAVs are deployed to NAS Rota, Spain. They
self-deploy and are ready for tasking within 24 hours.
HAE UAV sensor data transmission is sent via commercial satellite such as
PANAMSAT or INTELSAT when the UAV is operating OTH. If the UAV were
operating within LOS, the common data link (CDL) would be used. Either way, the
sensor data is relayed to the Ground Control Element and subsequently an imagery
exploitation site. The exploitation sites include the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC) and theater Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), if created.
At this point in our example, the CBG is steaming toward the crisis and preparing
an action plan. Imagery from the HAE UAVs is flowing to the exploitation sites where it
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is being processed and disseminated in a useable form. Some examples of disseminated
products are verbal reports, printed documents, photographs and video. The means by
which these products can be disseminated are physical transfer, fax, and transfer through
computer networks such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS),
briefings, and tactical radio and satellite broadcasts such Global Broadcast Service (GBS)
and Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS).
The carrier receives the intelligence derived from the HAE UAV through the
same channels from which it receives other intelligence data. The BG is hampered by the
HAE UAVs classification as a virtual satellite and not as a tactical instrument. The final
product the carrier receives is both time-late and diluted. The battle group has limited
access to the real-time HAE UAV imagery and must plan using stale, text-based and still
frame data.
2. HAE UAV Dynamic Retasking
In our scenario, the carrier battle group commander decides that he must have
fresh imagery of a proposed amphibious landing site. Since no HAE UAV mission has
yet overflown the proposed landing site and the battle group is not within range, he
endeavors to task an HAE UAV with the mission.
A possible mechanism to achieve this tasking follows. The theater J-2 assigned
by the JFC is responsible for the collection management of the HAE UAV system. This
involves accepting all Requests For Information (RFI), prioritizing these requests based
on the JFC's objectives, and defining reporting requirements. The J-2 and his staff make
recommendations concerning mission and target priority for reconnaissance assets. RFIs
are handled using existing architecture for collection management and are prioritized by
the J-2 based on the CINC's essential elements of information (EEI).
Once the J-2 fulfills these responsibilities, the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) schedules sorties for the HAE UAV based upon the requirements
given him by the J-2. The JFACC is responsible for integrating the HAE UAV into the
Air Control Plan (ACP) so as to deconflict manned and unmanned operations in the same
airspace. All HAE UAV sorties are tasked in accordance with the ATO. The ATO cycle
is currently a 72-hour cycle that includes these steps. Because of the long time required
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for planning and coordinating all air operations through the ATO, it inhibits dynamic
HAE UAV tasking.
This describes a process, which according to the HAE UAV CONOPS will
successfully task the UAV, but will not support true dynamic collection requirements.
Since the battle group commander's request must pass through a number of "wickets" to
be integrated with other collection requirements and then written into the ATO, the
chance of timely execution is nil.
UAVs, however, are inherently flexible intelligence gatherers. Since they are
remotely flown from the ground, they can be instantly steered, whereas a manned aircraft
must first be contacted and satellites are inherently difficult to dynamically retask.
Clearly, a mechanism must be developed to ensure responsive HAE UAV dynamic
retasking outside the normal ATO cycle.
3. HAE UAV Sensor to Shooter
Given that the battle group has arrived at the area of operations, it is now in a
position to exercise force. The air defenses, however, have not yet been neutralized and
fleet aircraft are kept "feet wet" until successful Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
(SEAD) occurs. The first strikes are planned for the evening and will consist of
Tomahawks and strike aircraft. Only the high-flying, stealthy HAE UAVs are considered
an acceptable risk for flight until then. Destroyers will remain within 1 miles of shore to
neutralize mobile targets of opportunity with Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS).
A target of opportunity occurs when an analyst at the Joint Information Center
detects a Silkworm anti-ship missile being transported to the coast. Further intelligence
indicates that the Silkworm will be fired towards the battle group. This information is
passed to the carrier battle group via flash message traffic. The order is given to a
Destroyer to "take" the Silkworm with Naval Gunfire and the target coordinates from the
flash message are given.
Since the Destroyer does not see the target, it must rely on external spotting to
adjust its fire. Normally, a spotter on the ground providing corrections over an UHF
radio net would accomplish this. The ship would receive the report, make corrections
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according to the spotter, and fire a salvo until the spotter indicated the fire was accurate
by requesting "fire for effect".
The HAE UAV imagery dissemination is essentially a stovepipe system, no
mechanism exists to deliver the imagery to tactical endusers. The carrier has the
capability to receive the imagery time-late, but the Destroyer has no capability to receive
the imagery at all. This means that the Destroyer can't use the imagery directly to make
fire corrections.
The possibility exists for the HAE UAV to handoff the target to the Destroyer,
which could utilize its organic VTUAV as the sensor to shooter platform. This is a viable
solution, but a procedure to transfer a target from the HAE UAV to a VTUAV must also
be developed to make it effective.
A final alternative is for the Destroyer to receive the imagery directly from the
HAE UAV. This is described in the TCS CONOPS as level II reception; direct reception
from the HAE UAV. This method, however, will be shown to be inappropriate.
4. HAE UAV Deconfliction
In our scenario, the battle group is on station near the country of Orange. The
battle group is tracking all air contacts, including the HAE UAVs, with SPY phased-array
radar. According to the HAE UAV CONOPS, the battle group does not have JMCIS
track information on the HAE UAVs to de-conflict them from radar tracks. The HAE
UAV CONOPS does not address the dissemination of real-time air vehicle track
information from the ground control element to the fleet. Therefore, the battle group
must assume that any airborne track is hostile if it does not hold a JMCIS track to merge
it with.
The HAE UAV must be de-conflicted from battle group aircraft, gunfire, and
missiles through coordination with the Joint Commander. The Joint Commander will
promulgate a plan to apportion the airspace. The battle group must ensure the
coordinated use of airspace with the HAE UAV before any strike. With its altitude
capabilities, the HAE UAV can loiter at 60,000 feet while strike aircraft and missiles pass
below it. This vertical apportionment of airspace gives the HAE UAV the ability to
provide real-time Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). [Ref 1 1 : p. II-6]
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5. VTUAV Command and Control
Tactical UAVs are now introduced to our scenario. The VTUAV CONOPS
envisions that these UAVs will be flown from air capable ships to support battle group
operations whenever necessary. This scenario affords the battle group an excellent
opportunity to utilize the capabilities of the embarked VTUAVs. The VTUAVs are
initially tasked to remain clear of Orange until the risk of loss to anti-aircraft fire is
acceptable. At that point, VTUAVs are tasked to fly over Orange.
The mission of any particular flight is determined by the objectives of the battle
group commander. The flight, along with the mission and operating area, is scheduled in
the ATO. The goal of the ATO is to coordinate the VTUAVs from the various ships to
maintain continuous coverage over the areas of interest. The author believes that the
areas of interest will be delineated in the Special Instructions (SPINS). A VTUAV
launches to execute a swap with another VTUAV on-station. The relieved VTUAV
recovers, refuels, and is prepared for its next flight.
The battle group commander, and every ship in the battle group, has continuous
real-time tracks of the VTUAVs. This track information is taken from the TCS of the
airborne vehicle's controlling ship and relayed throughout the fleet with JMCIS. Ships
will individually merge a radar track with the JMCIS track to maintain an accurate
picture.
This real-time track information allows the battle group commander to monitor
VTUAVs positions to effectively direct them. Although the SPINS contains route
information and way point coordinates, it does not provide tactical direction for each
mission. Modifications to the route are directions that must be promulgated while the
VTUAV is in flight and the tactical situation unfolds.
These directions to the VTUAVs may occur to clear a lane of fire for NGFS, to
clear airspace for Close Air Support (CAS), or to proceed to another area of interest. In
such a situation, the VTUAV CONOPS does not address how the actual command will
reach the operator at the TCS.
Given the need to direct a VTUAV to an ammunition dump for surveillance, the
battle group commander examines the positions of all VTUAVs and their status. He
directs one from a lower priority target to the ammunition dump. The present manner to
29
accomplish the command is to direct it over a voice net to the host ship's Combat
Information Center (CIC) and then relay it to the operator at the TCS. This method is
subject to error and delay. A mechanism must be developed to graphically convey the
command directly to the TCS console.
6. VTUAV Imagery Interpretation and Exploitation
After a VTUAV is directed to the ammunition dump, the imagery must be
interpreted to yield intelligence. For the HAE UAVs, the imagery is forwarded to a
national exploitation facility where photo interpretation experts analyze the imagery. In
the battle group environment, each air capable ship has the ability to embark and launch
VTUAVs. These ships must also ensure the exploitations of the imagery.
Since the manning of these ships does not normally include photo interpretation
personnel, the imagery must be forwarded to a site with suitable interpretation
capabilities. Ship personnel undoubtedly have the ability to perform basic photo
interpretation, but valuable, additional information can be gained from the imagery with
appropriately trained personnel.
The TCS CONOPS indicates that the imagery has connectivity both within the
ship and off the ship. Neither the TCS CONOPS nor VTUAV CONOPS, however,
indicates where the imagery should be routed for proper analysis or how it should get
there. Although the ammunition dump is used for purpose of example, the VTUAV will
almost continuously provide imagery that is worthy of proper interpretation. If it is not
worthy of interpretation, a trained interpreter should make that decision.
7. VTUAV Imagery Dissemination
According to the TCS CONOPS, the ammunition dump imagery received in the
scenario has the potential for connectivity both on and off the host ship. The CONOPS
describes connectivity to a host of standard architectures but does not describe which of
these C4I architectures will be employed in the fleet. TCS connectivity to the standard
C4I nodes is limited at sea due to limitations in shipboard space, separation from
terrestrial networks, and technical difficulty of maintaining satellite links. The nature of
the connectivity is important for several reasons.
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As previously stated, the imagery should be routed to a suitable exploitation site.
Although live video is not required for imagery analysis, the throughput should have the
capacity for live video. Video has advantages over still frame imagery in some
situations. Since the ship doesn't have properly trained analysts, it may also not capture
the most suitable still frames for transmission to the exploitation site. By sending full
video, the exploitation site can chose the best frames to analyze.
The nature of the imagery dissemination must also be considered for the sensor to
shooter problem. Targets under surveillance by one ship's VTUAV may be assigned to a
different ship for destruction by naval gunfire. Since ships will launch VTUAVs in
accordance with the ATO, the position of ships controlling a VTUAV will change
throughout the day and have no correlation with the position of the target. When the
battle group commander decides to fire upon the target, a different ship than the one
controlling the VTUAV could be in a better position to direct gunfire on the target.
The problem with this scenario is that the sensor to shooter loop IAW NCW
doctrine has not been established. Ultimately, the firing ship must have feedback on the
accuracy of its fire. The VTUAV will produce the imagery that is interpreted for this
feedback. However, where the imagery gets interpreted and how the feedback reaches
the firing ship needs to be established. This problem must be resolved for effective
VTUAV operations.
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IV. UAV EMPLOYMENT MODEL
The last chapter exposed limitations of current UAV operational employment.
This chapter further addresses the issues and offers potential solutions. First, HAE UAV
CONOPS are addressed followed by VTUAV CONOPS.
A. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model that could be used to overcome
the demonstrated limitations of current UAV doctrine. Alternatives must be examined
and, if possible, modeled to arrive at solutions that provide the greatest utility.
The difficulty in arriving at a solution is recognizing that the technology ofUAVs
is developing quicker than the underlying "intelligence machine" and more importantly,
is outpacing the advancement of naval C4I systems. While the bandwidth capacity and
technical capability of warships is increasing, the challenge is to develop the CONOPS
that will weave the capabilities ofUAVs into this technological fabric.
System capabilities due to the technological revolution are rapidly increasing
which is expanding the ways to harness and exploit them. This new technology has
spawned such names as IT21, NCW and so on. The rapid introduction of large numbers
of UAVs into the operating forces has the potential to become another force multiplier.
We need to find ways to use UAVs in an intelligent, integrated manner that is capitalizes
on this technological revolution.
Doctrine is often developed after accompanying equipment is installed and
operational, so assumptions must therefore be made about future C4I capabilities. The
UAVs described herein have not yet achieved operational maturity. Accordingly, the
HAE UAV CONOPS bills itself as a "living document to be updated." Likewise, this is a
conceptual thesis based on current information and the anticipated continuation of
existing trends.
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B. HAE UAV CONOPS
This section addresses three HAE UAV CONOPS issues: dynamic retasking,
imagery to the tactical warfighter and HAE target hand off to VTUAVs.
1. Dynamic Retasking
Current HAE UAV CONOPS aims to support the warfighter' s immediate
intelligence needs through a process called dynamic retasking [Ref 8: p. 4.6.2]. Dynamic
retasking is defined as the process of altering the HAE UAV's mission plan in real time
to satisfy immediate requirements. The process of dynamically tasking the HAE UAV as
described in the HAE UAV CONOPS does not support the required response to these
immediate requirements.
The HAE UAV is considered a surrogate satellite, and theater-level Joint tasking
is the norm. ATO tasking can continue to be the norm because the ATO allows for
pursuing targets of opportunity. A reach-back mechanism must, however, be included to
allow for direct tasking by tactical war fighters. This process must be efficient enough to
respond to time sensitive targets.
Revisiting our scenario, the battle group commander has decided that he requires
airborne imagery of the intended amphibious landing site. He must have the imagery
within one hour because it is critical to the successful planning of an amphibious landing
at the beach. He knows that a HAE UAV is operating in the vicinity and endeavors to
task it with his mission.
A standard procedure must be developed that will facilitate the timely processing
of similar real-time collection requirements. This procedure must ultimately connect the
requestor of collection support to the actual collector operator. The request must also be
dynamically evaluated and prioritized against similar requests and the scheduled mission
objectives.
The dynamic tasking process begins with the requestor. In this case we have cast
the battle group commander as the requestor, but the request could be initiated at any
level. Assuming that the request initiated at a subordinate level, a standard request
format must be utilized. According the HAE UAV CONOPS, standard requests for
immediate support should be submitted using normal air request procedures, such as
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AIRREQSUP and AIRREQRECON messages. For purpose of example, the format will
be the AIRREQRECON message. This message is forwarded to the commander over
standard tactical fleet circuits for action. The battle group commander forwards the
message to the Joint Task Force Commander's staff and further up the Chain of
Command to the command responsible for the effective dynamic tasking of the HAE
UAV.
The overall responsibility for dynamic retasking of the HAE UAV rests with the
theater CINC or his designated Joint Force Commander. According to Joint Pub 2.0, the
JFC's guidance and directives will determine the way in which the intelligence system
operates during the type of crisis described in Chapter III.
Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and
direction, estimate of the situation and objectives. The commander's
requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system
components, organization, services, and products [Joint Pub 2.0]
Since the JFC carries the responsibility of being the principal driver of the
intelligence system, he may provide guidance on how he wants his J-2 to handle requests
for immediate support. The JFC decides which tasking is more urgent, the ATO tasking
or time-critical imagery tasking, and directs the HAE UAV at his discretion. These
directives ensure that his staff knows that he gives the dynamic retasking collection
missions particular priority with regards to other collection missions.
Furthermore, the JFC has the option of dictating how he wants the time-critical
imagery requests routed. The author believes that the standard fleet request should be via
AIRREQRECON flash message traffic. The JFC must also follow-up his decision on a
specific immediate intelligence support request with a reply indicating the disposition of
the request.
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2. Imagery to the Tactical Warfighter
A related issue to dynamic tasking is the dissemination of HAE UAV imagery to
the tactical war fighter. The existing dissemination of HAE UAV video is composed of
raw imagery to analysis centers, GBS capable ships, and TCS capable ships. This raw
imagery is of limited use to the tactical warfighter.
Raw imagery, even when comprehensive and unquestionably accurate, is
of little use to the war fighter. It may be a wonderfully clear photographic
image of some location, but without additional, vital information, such as
the location of the photo, its orientation to true north, and its time and date
of origin, the image might be useless. [Ref 12: p. 21]
Imagery to the war fighter should be processed by an analysis center to be useful.
The imagery analysis can be performed at two places, the theater Joint Intelligence
Centers (JICs), and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). The Ground
Control Element can also perform limited annotation of received imagery before
forwarding it. The problem with utilizing the stateside analysis center for imagery to the
war fighter is the disconnection between the analysis and the customer. The war fighter
request for imagery must be routed to the states and the response will suffer.
The better alternative is to utilize the theater analysis center or the Ground
Control Element, when feasible. This approach keeps the analysis closer to the decision
center where the imagery requests are handled. The stateside capability is also not
needed since much of the analysis will only comprise of annotating the imagery with date
of origin, time and true north.
In any case, the performance of the system can be evaluated as the time it takes
the tactical warfighter to receive properly analyzed and annotated imagery. Since part of
the imagery analysis problem involves deciding which imagery the warfighter requires,
the analysis system must be developed to process the imagery for targets in real-time.
Alternatives for connectivity after annotation depend on the quality of the images
required by the war fighter. The instances where still imagery is sufficient must be
differentiated from a justifiable need for streaming video. The sensor to shooter problem,
for instance, requires moving video while the battle group commanders reconnaissance of
the beach only requires a still photo to examine the location of defenses or obstacles.
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The emerging GBS concept is expected to form the foundation for near
real-time dissemination of UAV intelligence products to exploitation
systems and battlefield customers. [Ref 8: p. 6.1]
The nature of the imagery delivered to the naval war fighter depends largely on
improvements in broadband, namely satellite, communications capability. To date, only
the High Value Units (HVU) have the broadband access necessary to receive streaming
video. Still imagery, however, can be transmitted over conventional communications
channels, such as UHF and IMMARSAT. Ultimately, full access to streaming video
should be available to all tactical users, independent of location. GBS on the smaller
units would provide the bulk of this capability.
3. HAE UAV Target Hand-off to VTUAV
In the scenario, an analyst at the Joint Information Center detects a Silkworm anti-
ship missile being transported to the coast. The problem is how to use this intelligence
gained from the HAE UAV to direct force against the Silkworm missile. The answer is
that HAE UAVs are considered surrogate satellites and are not intended, nor should they
be employed, as a direct sensor to shooter platform. They operate within a matrix of
intelligence platforms and provide vital cueing information to sensors directly supporting
the shooters.
Normally intelligence collectors do not have training in directing force
application. Their training, organizational structure, and communications
systems provide information to the decision maker who directs forces
against the enemy. Targeters, on the other hand, are not normally as well
versed in the collection management field. As military forces field more
and more surveillance systems such as UAVs, it is extremely important to
develop concepts of operations that take full advantage of available near-
real-time combat information to direct fires. [Ref 13: p. 14]
According to the HAE UAV CONOPS, the intention is to place the value added
that exploitation provides in direct contact, whether physically or electronically, with the
tactical element which can best use the information to either retask the platform and
collect more information, or use the intelligence to nominate a high value target
[Ref 8: p. 5.4.2]. This agrees with the concept of network-centric warfare and implies
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that the HAE UAV will act as a cueing mechanism for the war fighter to utilize a tactical
UAV or other tactical sensors as appropriate. The solution that passes targets from the
HAE UAV to the VTUAV is ideally suited for sensor to shooter.
An alternative to handing the target off to a tactical UAV is to utilize the level II
(direct receipt of imagery) capabilities of the shipboard TCS to allow the ship to receive
imagery directly from the HAE UAV. A sensor to shooter link could then be established.
This, however, violates the presumption that the HAE UAV is primarily a strategic
theater level asset. Larger coverage area, deeper penetration and better imagery/analysis
make HAE UAVs ideal for target identification. If the HAE UAV is occupied with a
single target for a sensor to shooter engagement, it could miss detecting other targets.
The sensor to shooter mission when tasked to tactical a UAV, frees the HAE UAV for
continued search. This handoff employs all assets more effectively.
If a target handoff from the HAE UAV to a VTUAV is the solution, then a
process must be developed for a quick and efficient handoff. The goal is to minimize the
time from when the HAE UAV acquires a potential target to when that target is acquired
by a VTUAV. This process includes identifying a target and handing it off to the
VTUAV.
The limiting factor in this process is the man in the loop. The sensor data
received from the HAE UAV must currently be interpreted by analysts to yield
information about targets. This interpretation is time consuming and prone to error. A
potential solution is to integrate software into the process to alert the analysts to potential
targets. Software products such as ICE enhance characteristics of imagery to aid the
recognition of valid targets by analysts.
A method for the handoff is to utilize the capabilities of JMCIS. Since a flight
track of the HAE UAV can be monitored throughout the fleet in near real time, the same
network can be used to indicate a potential target. Once an analyst has resolved a target
from the HAE UAV sensor data, a target track can be created in the Common Operating
Picture (COP) of JMCIS. The target track can also contain amplifying data such as the
classification, time of last fix, and priority. This target track can then be used locally
within the battle group to cue a VTUAV to the target.
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C. VTUAV CONOPS
The focus will now shift from HAE UAVs to VTUAVs. Tactical UAVs are
envisioned to be employed from any air capable ship to support battle group operations
whenever necessary. The command and control challenge is to task the VTUAVs from
different ships to maintain required presence over areas of interest. Multiple UAVs could
also simultaneously cover several areas of interest.
While tasking the VTUAVs could be accomplished with the ATO and SPINS,
command and control must also be able to efficiently re-direct VTUAVs, analyze and
disseminate imagery, and perform sensor to shooter to direct force. Several options exist
that provide a solution to these problems. These include the LAMPS model, imagery
dissemination and analysis, and VTUAV sensor to shooter.
1 . VTUAV Tasking and Direction
A model currently exists that could be used to task VTUAVs. The LAMPS Mk
III helicopter is operationally similar to the VTUAV because it is launched from air
capable ships and controlled via data link. Many of the issues that are pertinent to
VTUAVs are addressed in the LAMPS operational model. The LAMPS model could
therefore be used as a basis for a VTUAV tasking.
The premises of the LAMPS model is that each ship is free to task the helicopter
when the battle group has no tasking. This allows ships the flexibility to conduct training
and to support its own missions. When the battle group requires LAMPS support, this is
published in the ATO. The helicopter is then launched and controlled from the host ship
to support the battle group mission. The helicopter track is monitored by the battle group
staff, and adjustments to the tasking are relayed through the host ship Combat
Information Center (CIC). These mission changes are relayed to the pilots through a
microwave datalink.
This model would also work well with VTUAVs. A ship would be free to fly its
VTUAV as necessary to support the ship's mission. It would be controlled entirely by the
Tactical Action Officer (TAO) from CIC. The VTUAV could be tasked by the battle
group via the ATO and launched and controlled by the host ships. Since each VTUAV
track is linked throughout the battle group by TCS connectivity to C4I nodes, the battle
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group staff is able to monitor tracks in real time. Decisions to retask the VTUAV, such
as response to a target cued by a HAE UAV, must then be communicated to the host ship
and ultimately the remote pilot at the TCS console. Since TCS is in the host ship, the
voice commands can be relayed from CIC to the TCS operator through internal ship's
circuits.
Voice commands, however, are not the best alternative for directing the VTUAV.
Voice is not efficient and leaves room for error and misinterpretation. The solution is
that commands to redirect the VTUAV must be electronically transmitted from the battle
group staff to the host ship and appear on the TCS console as fly-to points. This method
is quicker because it eliminates the delay inherent to relaying voice communications and
allows the TCS operator to directly utilize the fly-to points for VTUAV direction.
2. Imagery Dissemination and Analysis
An issue related to controlling the VTUAV is the dissemination and analysis of
the imagery. Although the VTUAV can be tasked for missions such as SIGINT and
COMREL, proper imagery dissemination and analysis will be central to the effectiveness
of the VTUAV. Host ships are not planned to have embarked imagery analysts nor does
the VTUAV CONOPS anticipate having analysts. The imagery must therefore be routed
elsewhere for imagery analysis. Additionally, the imagery must have the capability to be
routed throughout the battle group for sensor to shooter engagements utilizing the
VTUAV sensor data.
A solution to this problem is that the aircraft carrier, when present, could be used
as a central node for all VTUAV imagery dissemination and analysis. Although there are
no plans to operate VTUAVs from carriers, the VTUAV CONOPS anticipates that
aircraft carriers will have TCS installed. The TCS will be installed solely for the ability
to receive imagery from and to control VTUAVs. TCS has the ability to multi-cast the
imagery from any VTUAV to each TCS station in the battle group. This multi-cast
transmission path is only possible when the VTUAV is operating in the OTH mode with
the imagery being transmitted via satellite. Any TCS equipped ship in the satellite's
footprint can then receive the imagery.
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Since the communications path of VTUAVs that are operating in line of sight
mode is through a data link to the controlling ship, the aircraft carrier does not have
access to this imagery. The aircraft carrier only has the capability to receive imagery
from any VTUAV that is operating in OTH mode. In LOS mode, the beam is too narrow
for more than one ship. Therefore, any VTUAV operating in LOS mode must switch to a
satellite transmission path to solve the problem of how to get the imagery from the
VTUAV to the carrier.
Once the imagery has been received at the carrier, it can be interpreted by a
properly equipped imagery analysis center. This would include the software, computers,
and personnel to fully exploit the received imagery for information. In the analysis
center, imagery data becomes information to effect further action. This aligns well with
maintaining centralized VTUAV command and control at the carrier because the battle
group staff has the best picture of what each VTUAV is doing and can most effectively
direct them.
In addition to the advantages gained in imagery analysis, the battle group central
node also allows for increased coordination of VTUAVs with other battle group assets,
such as tactical air. The fusion of VTUAV control with tactical air allows for positive
airspace control during dynamic situations. Although airspace allocation for VTUAVs is
delineated for all phases of the flight, dynamic situations may require the close use of
airspace by both tacair and VTUAVs.
With a central node at the carrier, the battle group staff is in a better position to
effectively synchronize VTUAV tasking and targeting. The alternative is to allow each
ship to individually analyze the imagery and to de-centralize control, which results in a
division of effort. The battle group central node, however, leverages the effectiveness of
multiple VTUAVs by coordinating their actions and allowing a unity of effort. The
central node also allows the battle group staff to direct VTUAV imagery for sensor to
shooter and to ensure clear lanes of fire for naval gunfire.
3. VTUAV sensor to shooter
After VTUAV imagery has been analyzed to reveal a target, such as the Silkworm
anti-ship missile in the scenario, the imagery can be further utilized for a sensor to
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shooter engagement. This may occur after the target is cued to the VTUAV from a HAE
UAV, as discussed earlier, or if the target is found during a search by battle group assets.
In either case, the VTUAV must acquire the target. The VTUAV imagery can then be
interpreted for fire control corrections that are utilized by the shooter as appropriate.
A central VTUAV node is important for the sensor to shooter problem because
the ship receiving the VTUAV target imagery may not be in the best position for an
engagement. For example, a ship on the opposite end of the battle group may be in the
best position to engage the target while the VTUAV host ship is poorly positioned. In
addition, the shooter may be an aircraft. A central node will be best to determine host
ship to shooter relationships and to clear a lane of fire for engaging ships. Targeting
information must then flow from the host ship, which controls the VTUAV and is
receiving the imagery, to the shooter ship, to complete the sensor to shooter loop.
A sensor to shooter loop is more accurately described as a sensor to processor to
shooter loop, because the imagery must at some point be interpreted for the data. The
raw imagery is worthless to the shooter unless it can be interpreted for the data which is
used for the gunfire corrections. The point at which the imagery is interpreted for data
marks the difference between any two solutions. The best solution, however, minimizes
the overall latency of the sensor to shooter loop.
Several options exist for completing this sensor to processor to shooter link. The
first option is for the VTUAV control ship to interpret the imagery and relay fire control
data to the firing ship over a voice network. This solution is essentially similar to the
present solution of using field spotters. The limitation is that rate of fire is constrained by
the latency inherent with voice communications. With this system, the time to first round
is slower, more rounds are required to destroy the target, and the total time to destroy the
target is longer.
A second problem with this approach is that assumptions are made about the
qualification of spotters on each ship. An FFG, for instance, may observe the target on
its VTUAV imagery but may not have a spotter qualified to interpret the imagery for
gunfire correction calls. The best solution for this method would be to utilize the central
node for gunfire corrections. Since the carrier has the capability to receive all OTH
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VTUAV imagery, it could standardize sensor to shooter by generating all gunfire
corrections.
The inherent limitation of relaying gunfire corrections over voice networks can
be solved by allowing the engagement ship to judge its own gunfire corrections. This can
be achieved by routing the VTUAV imagery from the host ship to the engaging ship.
This solution moves the processing towards the engaging ship and away from the
imagery source. The advantage with this solution is that latency is reduced, but the
difficulty is that transferring imagery instead of data to the engaging ship requires greater
communications capacity.
The ultimate solution to any sensor to shooter loop would be to automate the
imagery interpretation and move it as close to the UAV as possible. For instance, if the
processing were performed by the UAV, then only a relatively small amount of data
would be forwarded to the shooter, greatly reducing the demand on communications
networks and increasing responsiveness.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this Thesis is to demonstrate the increasing sophistication and
growing utility of modern UAVs and the underlying problem with command and control,
which is unprepared to leverage these capabilities into combat effectiveness. The
problem can be summarized as a strategic imagery analysis structure that cannot meet the
dynamic requirements of tactical reconnaissance and under-developed CONOPS that do
not address necessary requirements.
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section will develop a conclusion and recommendation for each issue
developed in Chapter IV.
1. HAE UAV Dynamic Retasking
A standard procedure must be developed that will facilitate the timely processing
of real-time collection requests by tactical end users. This procedure must ultimately
connect the requestor of information to the actual collector operator. These requests must
also be dynamically evaluated and prioritized against similar requests and scheduled
mission objectives.
Recommendation- Develop a HAE UAV CONOPS that provides a standardized
methodology for the submission and evaluation of immediate imagery requirements by
tactical users. This should be exercised by actively integrating UAV operations into
routine exercises and peacetime training.
2. HAE UAV Imagery to the Tactical Warflghter
The existing dissemination of HAE UAV video is composed of raw imagery to
analysis centers and GBS capable ships. TCS equipped ships may also receive raw
imagery directly from the HAE UAV when within line of sight. Video imagery
processed by an analysis center, however, is only available to the fleet through GBS. In
addition, the imagery analysis process is not responsive to tactical requirements.
Recommendation- Develop an imagery analysis system that has the capability to
provide responsive service for tactical users. The processed imagery should be made
available to all fleet users through GBS or similar high-bandwidth solution.
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3. HAE UAV Target Hand-off to VTUAV
The HAE UAVs large coverage area, deep penetration and better imagery make it
ideal for target identification. Once a target is identified, the HAE UAV will act as a
cueing mechanism for the war fighter to utilize tactical UAVs and tactical weapons as
appropriate. The HAE UAV is then free to continue searching for other targets. A
process must be develop for quick and efficient handoff of these targets to VTUAVs.
Recommendation- Develop a process that can efficiently hand HAE UAV targets
off to VTUAVs. The goal of this process is to minimize the time for a VTUAV to
acquire a target from when it is handed-off.
3. VTUAV Tasking and Direction
VTUAVs will be employed and controlled from air capable ships such as Cruisers
and Destroyers. No plan exists to deploy VTUAVs onto carriers, but the carrier will have
the option to maintain operational control over these VTUAVs. At other times, the
VTUAV organic ship will maintain operational control. A method must be developed to
task VTUAVs in each situation.
Recommendation- Utilize the LAMPS Mk III model for tasking VTUAVs. This
model stipulates that the host ship is free to exercise and task its VTUAV to support the
ship's mission as long as the battle group has no underlying requirements. If the battle
group assumes operational control, then a method must be developed to relay flight
directions to the VTUAV operator on the host ship. Voice directions should be avoided
in favor of electronically transmitted fly-to points directly to the operator's console.
5. VTUAV Imagery Dissemination and Analysis
Proper imagery analysis and dissemination will be the central to the effectiveness
of the VTUAV. The host ships, due to manning and equipment constraints, will not be
able to effectively analyze VTUAV imagery. An aircraft carrier would can be better
equipped to analyze and distribute the imagery, but the capability does not exist to
transmit streaming video imagery to an aircraft carrier.
Recommendation- Equip aircraft carriers to act as a central node for VTUAV
imagery analysis and dissemination. Develop the software and firmware to streamline
the imagery analysis process. Utilize the capabilities of TCS to transmit VTUAV
imagery to the aircraft carrier.
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6. VTUAV Sensor to Shooter
After VTUAV imagery has been analyzed to reveal a target, the imagery can be
utilized for a sensor to shooter engagement. The imagery can be interpreted for fire
control corrections that are utilized by the shooter as appropriate. Since the VTUAV host
ship may not be the shooter, this information must be interpreted and relayed from the
host ship to the shooter.
Recommendation- Utilize the aircraft carrier when it is available as a central
node for VTUAV sensor to shooter engagements. Maintain Air Naval Gunfire Liaison
Company (ANGLICO) personnel onboard the carrier in order to provide expert,
centralized gunfire support capability.
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